We study an elimination tournament with four contestants, each of whom has either a high value of winning (a strong player) or a low value of winning (a weak player) and these values are commonknowledge. Each pair-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. The winners of the …rst stage (semi…nal) compete in the second stage (…nal) for the …rst prize, while the losers of the …rst stage compete for the third prize. We examine whether or not the game for the third prize is pro…table for the designer who wishes to maximize the total e¤ort of the players. We demonstrate that if there are at least two strong players, there is always a seeding of the players such that the third place game is not pro…table. On the other hand, if there are at least two weak players, then there is always a seeding of the players such that the third place game becomes pro…table. JEL Classification Numbers: D72, D82, D44.
the third place game to the players'expected total e¤ort in elimination tournaments and as such to decide whether the third place game is worthwhile or super ‡uous.
The elimination tournament was …rst studied in the statistical literature. The pioneering paper of David (1959) considered the winning probability of the top player in a four-player tournament with a random seeding (see also Glenn (1960) and Searles (1963) for early contributions). Most works in this literature suggest formulas for computing overall probabilities with which various players will win the tournament (see Horen and Reizman (1985) who consider general, …xed win probabilities and analyze tournaments with four and eight players) while others (see, for example, Hwang (1982) , Horen and Reizman (1985) and Schwenk (2000)) consider various optimality criteria for choosing seedings. 2 These works assume that for each game among players i and j there is a …xed, exogenously given probability that i beats j: This probability does not depend on the stage of the tournament in which the particular game takes place nor on the identity of the expected opponent at the next stage. In contrast as opposed to the statistical literature, in the elimination tournaments studied in the economic literature the winning probabilities in each game become endogenous in that they result from mixed equilibrium strategies and are dependent on continuation values of winning.
Moreover, the win probabilities depend on the stage of the tournament in which the game takes place as well as on the identity of the future expected opponents. For example, Rosen (1986) and Krakel (2014) studied an elimination tournament in which the probability of winning a match is a stochastic function of the players' e¤orts, Gradstein and Konrad (1999) and Stracke et al. (2014) studied an elimination tournament where players are matched in the Tullock contest, and Groh et al. (2012) studied an elimination tournament where players are matched in the all-pay auction in each of the stages.
We consider the elimination tournament model studied by Groh et al. (2012) in which four players are matched in the all-pay auction in each stage. 3 Each of the players is either strong (has a high value of winning) or weak (has a low value of winning) where the players'types are commonly known. In the …rst 2 There are many possible seedings in an elimination tournament. In a tournament with 2 N players, there are di¤erent seedings. This yields 3 seedings for 4 players, 315 seedings for 8 players, 638,512,875 seedings for 16 players and 1.
2253 10 26 seedings for 32 players. 3 The all-pay auction under complete information has been studied, among others, by Hilman and Samet (1987) , Hilman and Riley (1989), Baye et al. (1993 Baye et al. ( , 1996 and Sela (2012) .
stage, two pairs of players simultaneously compete in two semi…nals. The two winners (one in each semi…nal) compete in the …nal, and the winner of the …nal obtains the …rst prize while the loser of the …nal obtains the second prize. The losers of the semi…nals compete in the third place game for the third prize.
We show that the third prize has two opposite e¤ects on the players'expected total e¤ort. On the one hand, the third place game is an additional game in which the players exert e¤ort and as such the expected total e¤ort in the tournament increases. On the other hand, the players'expected values of winning in the semi…nal are the di¤erences of their expected payo¤s in the …nal and in the third place. Therefore, the third place game decreases the players' expected values in the semi…nals and as such decreases their expected e¤orts in that stage. When the players are symmetric, namely, they have the same type, either strong or weak, their e¤orts in the semi…nals are relatively small since their expected payo¤s in the …nal are small too and then the positive e¤ect of the third place game on the expected total e¤ort is higher than its negative e¤ect. As such, it is obvious that the designer who wishes to maximize the expected total e¤ort in the elimination tournament should consider a third place game. Consequently, we will assume that the players are asymmetric and that the ratio of their types (strongnweak ) is signi…cant. In that case, whether or not the third place game has a positive contribution to the players'expected total e¤ort is not at all clear.
We tackle this issue by …rst assuming that there is one strong player (a dominant player) and three weak players, and show that if the …rst prize is su¢ ciently larger than the other prizes, then the existence of the third place game increases the players' expected total e¤ort in the tournament. When we assume, however, that there is one weak player (an inferior player) and three strong players, we show that if the inferior player's value of winning is su¢ ciently small, then the existence of the third place game decreases the players'expected total e¤ort in the tournament.
We consider next the case of two strong players and two weak players for which the seeding of the players in the semi…nals plays a key role. When the two strong players as well as the two weak players compete against each other in the semi…nals, we …nd that if the weak players'value of winning is su¢ ciently small, then the third place game decreases the players'expected total e¤ort. On the other hand, when each strong player competes against a weak player in a semi…nal, then if the weak players' values is su¢ ciently small, then the third place game increases the players'expected total e¤ort in the tournament.
Based on our …ndings we can conclude that in an elimination tournament with four players, if there are at least two strong players the third place game does not necessarily increase the expected total e¤ort. On the other hand, if there are at least two weak players, by choosing the right seeding of players, the third place game does increase the players'expected total e¤ort. In sum, even if the third prize is an extra prize that does not decrease the values of the higher prizes, it still may not increase the players' total e¤ort in elimination tournaments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the elimination tournament model. In Sections 3 and 4 we analyze the model with one dominant player and with one inferior player respectively. In Section 5 we analyze the model with the same number of weak and strong players. Section 6 concludes.
The model
The model consists of four players (or teams) i = 1; :::; 4; competing for three di¤erent prizes in an elimination tournament. In the …rst stage, two pairs of players simultaneously compete in two semi…nals. In the second stage, the two winners (one in each semi…nal) compete in the …nal, and the winner obtains the …rst prize while the loser obtains the second prize. The losers of the semi…nals then compete in the third place game for the third prize where the prize for the loser is normalized to zero. We model each match among two players as an all-pay auction: both players exert e¤ort, and the one exerting the higher e¤ort wins.
Player i 0 s value for the …rst prize is v i ; for the second prize it is v i , 0 < 1; and for the third prize v i ; 0 < . The players'values are common knowledge. We assume that each player's value v i has two possible types, either strong
In the following, we assume that v H >> v L ; namely, the strong player's value is much higher than the weak player's value. The reason is that if the di¤erence between these values is su¢ ciently small, then, because of the (almost) symmetry, the players do not expect a meaningful payo¤ in the …nal and therefore they will exert a negligible e¤ort in the semi…nal. As such, the e¤orts of the players in the third place game will increase their expected total e¤ort.
However, if the di¤erence between the players'value is su¢ ciently large, the players'e¤ort in the semi…nal is not negligible and as a result of the third place game it decreases. Thus, it is not clear whether or not the third place game increases or decreases the players'expected total e¤ort.
If in a …nal, players i and j exert e¤orts of e 
and analogously for player j: In the third place game between players i and j, if they exert e¤orts of e the payo¤ for player i is given by
and, analogously for player j. Player i 0 s payo¤ in a semi…nal between players i and j is given by 
and analogously for player j: Note that each player's payo¤ in a semi…nal depends on the expected utility associated with participation in the …nal (Eu Suppose that players i and j compete in the semi…nal and that if player i wins this game, his conditional expected payo¤ is w i given the possible opponents in the …nal. Similarly, if player i loses this game, his conditional expected payo¤ is l i . Without loss of generality, we assume that w i l i w j l j . Then, according to Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996) , there is always a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium,
which players i and j randomize on the interval [0; w j l j ] according to their e¤ort cumulative distribution functions, which are given by
Thus, player i's equilibrium e¤ort in this game is uniformly distributed; that is
while player j's equilibrium e¤ort is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
Player j 0 s probability of winning against player i is then
The players'expected payo¤s are
u j = l j and the players'expected total e¤ort is
An elimination tournament with a dominant player
Assume that there is a dominant player such that the players'values for the …rst prize are
In that case, the seeding of the players in the …rst stage is irrelevant, and, without loss of generality, we consider the seeding 1-2,3-4; namely, players 1 and 2 compete against each other in one of the semi…nals, and players 3 and 4 compete against each other in the other semi…nal.
The players'expected payo¤s
The …nal: If player 1 (the dominant player or the only strong one) wins in the semi…nal, he competes against a weak player in the …nal, and therefore by (7), his expected payo¤ is
If player 2 (a weak player) wins in the semi…nal, he competes against a weak player in the …nal, and therefore by (7), his expected payo¤ is
If either player 3 or player 4 (both of them are weak players) wins in the semi…nal, he competes either against a strong player (player 1) or against a weak one (player 2) in the …nal, and, in both cases, by (10), his expected payo¤ is
The third place game: If player 1 loses in the semi…nal, he competes against a weak player in the third place game, and therefore by (10) his expected payo¤ is
If player 2 loses in the semi…nal, he competes against a weak player in the third place game, and therefore by (10) , his expected payo¤ is
If player 3 (or player 4) loses in the semi…nal, he competes either against a strong player (player 1) or against a weak player (player 2) in the third place game, and, in both cases, by (10) , his expected payo¤ is
The semi…nals: Since player 1 will compete against a weak player either in the …nal or in the third place game, his expected payo¤ from winning in the semi…nal is the di¤erence between his expected payo¤s in these events, and by (9) and (12), his expected payo¤ is
Since player 2 will compete against a weak player either in the …nal or in the third place game, by (10) and (13) , his expected payo¤ is
Player 3 ( or player 4) competes in the …nal against player 1 with probability q S 1;2 and then his expected payo¤ from winning in the semi…nal is the di¤erence between his expected payo¤ in the …nal when he competes against the dominant player and his expected payo¤ in the third place game when he competes against player 2. On the other hand, player 3 competes in the …nal against player 2 with probability 1 q S 1;2 , and then his expected payo¤ from winning in the semi…nal is the di¤erence between his expected payo¤ in the …nal when he competes against player 2 and his expected payo¤ in the third place game when he competes against player 1. Thus, by (11) and (14), the expected payo¤ of players 3 and 4 in the semi…nal is
where by (6) , the probability that player 1 wins against player 2 in the semi…nal is given by
and by symmetry, q S 3;4 ; the probability that player 3 wins against player 4 in the semi…nal, is q 
The players'total e¤orts
The …nal: Player 1 competes with probability q S 1;2 in the …nal, and then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort
). Likewise, player 2 competes with probability 1 q S 1;2 in the …nal, and then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is v L v L . Thus, the expected total e¤ort is
The third place game: Player 1 competes with probability 1 q S 1;2 in the third place game, and then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is
). Likewise, player 2 competes with probability q S 1;2 in the third place game, and then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is v L : Thus, the expected total e¤ort is
The semi…nals: In the semi…nal in which player 1 competes against player 2, by (8) , (15) and (16), the expected total e¤ort is
and in the semi…nal in which players 3 and 4 compete against each other, the expected total e¤ort is Therefore, if we combine the expected total e¤orts in all the above stages, we obtain that the expected total e¤ort in the tournament is
Results
By (18) we have
Thus, we obtain that dT E( ;q Proposition 1 In an elimination tournament with three weak players and a dominant player who has a higher value of winning, if the …rst prize is larger than the sum of the other prizes ( + < 1), then the third place game increases the players' expected total e¤ ort.
Proposition 1 shows that since the dominant player has a high chance to win the tournament, the players do not exert high e¤orts in the semi…nal, and therefore the increase of the e¤ort there is higher than the decrease of the e¤ort in the semi…nals. Thus, the third place game increases the players'total e¤ort in the elimination tournament.
Assume now that there is an inferior player such that the players'values for the …rst prize are
In that case, the seeding of the players in the …rst stage is irrelevant, and without loss of generality, we consider the seeding 1-2,3-4; namely, players 1 and 2 compete against each other in one of the semi…nals, and players 3 and 4 compete against each other in the other one.
The players'expected payo¤s
The …nal: If either player 1 or player 2 (both of them are strong players) wins in the semi…nal, he competes with probability q S 3;4 against player 3 (a strong player) and with probability 1 q S 3;4 against player 4 (the inferior player or the only weak one) in the …nal. Therefore, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
If player 3 wins in the semi…nal, he will compete against a strong player in the …nal, and therefore, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
If player 4 wins in the semi…nal, he will compete against a strong player in the …nal, and therefore, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
The third place game: If player 1 (or player 2) loses in the semi…nal, he competes with probability q S 3;4 against player 4 in the third place game, and with probability of q S 3;4 against player 3 in the third place game. Therefore, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
If player 3 loses in the semi…nal, he will compete against a strong player in the third place game, and therefore, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
If player 4 loses in the semi…nal, he will compete against a strong player in the third place game, and therefore, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
The semi…nals: Player 3 wins with probability q S 3;4 in the semi…nal, and then the expected payo¤ of player 1 or player 2 is the di¤erence between their expected payo¤ in the …nal when they compete against player 3
and their expected payo¤ when they compete against player 4 in the third place game. On the other hand, player 3 loses with probability 1 q S 3;4 in the semi…nal, and then the expected payo¤ of player 1 or player 2 is the di¤erence between their expected payo¤ when they compete against player 4 in the …nal and their expected payo¤ when they compete against player 3 in the third place game. Thus, by (19) and (22), the expected payo¤ of player 1 and player 2 in the semi…nal is
Since player 3 will compete against a strong player either in the …nal or in the third place game, his expected payo¤ from winning in the semi…nal is the di¤erence between his expected payo¤ in these events, and by (20) and (23), his expected payo¤ is
Since player 4 will compete against a strong player either in the …nal or in the third place game, his expected payo¤ from winning in the semi…nal is the di¤erence between his expected payo¤ in these events, and by (21) and (24), his expected payo¤ is
where, by (6), the probability that player 3 wins against player 4 in the semi…nal is given by
The players'expected total e¤ort
The …nal: Player 3 competes with probability q S 3;4 in the …nal, and then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is (v H v H ). Player 4 competes with probability 1 q S 3;4 in the …nal, and then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is
). Thus, the expected total e¤ort is
The third place game: Player 3 competes with probability 1 q S 3;4 in the third place game, and then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is v H . Player 4 competes with probability q S 3;4 in the third place game, and then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is
The semi…nals: In the semi…nal in which player 1 competes against player 2, by (8), the expected total e¤ort is
and in the semi…nal in which players 3 and 4 compete against each other, by (8) , (25) and (26), the expected total e¤ort is
Therefore, if we combine the expected total e¤orts in all the above stages we obtain that the expected total e¤ort in the tournament is
Results
By (27) we have
This yields the following result:
Proposition 2 In an elimination tournament with three strong players and one inferior player who has a lower value of winning, if this value is su¢ ciently small, then the third place game decreases the players' expected total e¤ ort.
Proposition 2 shows that as a result of the third place game the increase of the e¤ort there is lower then the decrease of e¤ort in the semi…nals. Therefore, the third place game decreases the players'total e¤ort.
A balanced elimination tournament
We assume now that the tournament is balanced, namely, there are two strong and two weak players such that the players' values for the …rst prize are
In that case, we have two possible seedings of the players in the …rst stage: 1-2, 3-4 and 1-3,2-4. We begin the analysis with the …rst seeding, namely, the strong players (players 1 and 2) compete in one semi…nal and the weak players (players 3 and 4) compete in the other one.
The players'expected payo¤s (1-2,3-4)
The …nal: If either player 1 or player 2 (the strong players) wins in the …rst stage, he will compete against a weak player in the …nal, and then, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
If either player 3 or player 4 (the weak players) wins in the semi…nal, he will compete against a strong player in the …nal, and then, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
EP
The third place game: If player 1 (or player 2) loses in the semi…nal, he will compete against a weak player in the third place game, and then, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
If player 3 (or player 4) loses in the semi…nal, he will compete against a strong player in the third place game, and then, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
The semi…nals: Player 1(or player 2) will compete against a weak player either in the …nal or in the third place game, and therefore, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
Player 3 (or player 4) will compete against a strong player either in the …nal or in the third place game, and therefore, by (7), his expected payo¤ is
The players'expected total e¤ort (1-2,3-4)
The …nal: One of the strong players (player 1 or player 2) competes against a weak player (player 3 or player 4) in the …nal, and therefore, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is
The third place game: One of the strong players (player 1 or player 2) competes against a weak player (player 3 or player 4) in the third place game, and therefore, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is
The semi…nals: In the semi…nal between players 1 and 2, the expected e¤ort is equal to the di¤erence between these players'expected payo¤ in the …nal and in the third place game, and therefore, by (8) , (28) and (30), the expected total e¤ort is Similarly, in the semi…nal between players 3 and 4, by (8) , (29) and (31), the expected total e¤ort is
Therefore, if we combine the expected total e¤orts in all the above stages, we obtain that the expected total e¤ort in the tournament is
Results
By (32), we have
In an elimination tournament with two strong players who compete against each other in one of the semi…nals and two weak players who compete against each other in the other one, if the weak players' value of winning is su¢ ciently small, the third place game decreases the players' expected total e¤ ort.
Proposition 3 shows that since the strong players who compete against each other exert high e¤orts in the semi…nal, as a result of the third place game, the increase of the e¤ort there is lower than the decrease of the e¤ort in the semi…nals. Therefore, the third place game decreases the players'total e¤ort in the elimination tournament.
The players'expected payo¤s (1-3,2-4)
We assume that there are two strong players and two weak players such that the players'values for the …rst
= v L and the players'seeding in the …rst stage is now 1-3,2-4; namely, in each of the semi…nals, a strong player competes against a weak one.
The …nal: If player 2 (player 1) wins in the …rst stage, he competes with probability q S 1;3 (q S 2;4 ) against a strong player in the …nal, and then, by (7), his expected payo¤ is v H : On the other hand, player 2 (player 1) competes with probability 1 q S 1;3 (1 q S 2;4 ) against a weak player in the …nal, and then by (7), his expected
Thus, the expected payo¤ of player 2 (player 1) is
If player 4 (player 3) wins in the semi…nal, he competes with probability 1 q 
The third place game: If player 2 (player 1) loses in the semi…nal, he competes with probability q (7), his expected payo¤ is zero. Thus, the expected payo¤ of player 2 (or player 1) is
If player 4 (player 3) loses in the semi…nal, he competes with probability q The semi…nals: Player 2 (player 1) competes with probability q against a weak player in the …nal, and then his expected payo¤ from winning the semi…nal is the di¤erence between his expected payo¤ in the …nal when he competes against a weak player and his expected payo¤ in the third place game when he competes against a strong player. Therefore, by (7), (33) and (35), the expected payo¤ of players 1 and 2 is
Player 4 (player 3) competes with probability q 
By (6), (37) and (38), the probability that player 1 (player 2) wins against player 3 (player 4) in the semi…nal
The solution of the last equation is
where
The players'expected total e¤ort (1-3,2-4)
The …nal: The expected total e¤ort in the …nal depends on the identity of the …nalists which is unknown.
If the two strong players (players 1 and 2) compete against each other in the …nal, then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is v H (1 ), and if the two weak players (players 3 and 4) compete against each other in the …nal, then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is v L (1 ): On the other hand, if a strong player and a weak player compete against each other in the …nal, the expected total e¤ort is
The third place game: The expected total e¤ort in the third place game as well as in the …nal depends on the identity of the …nalists, which is unknown. If the two strong players (players 1 and 2) compete against each other in the third place game, then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is v H ; and if the two weak players (players 3 and 4) compete against each other in the third place game, then, by (8) , the expected total e¤ort is v L . On the other hand, if a strong and a weak player compete against each other in the third place game, the expected total e¤ort is
The semi…nals: In both semi…nals, a strong player competes against a weak player, and therefore, by (8) , the expected total e¤orts are
By (37) and (38), we obtain that
Therefore, if we combine the expected total e¤orts in all the above stages, we obtain that the expected total
By (39), we have
By (40), we have
When v L approaches zero, we have
Thus, we obtain that
Proposition 4 In an elimination tournament with two strong players and two weak players , if in each semi…nal a strong player competes against a weak player, and if the weak player's value of winning is su¢ ciently small, the third place game increases the players' expected total e¤ ort in the tournament.
Proposition 4 shows that the strong players do not exert high e¤orts against the weak players in the semi…nal, and therefore as a result of the third place game, the increase of the e¤ort there is higher than the decrease of the e¤ort in the semi…nals. Therefore, the third place game increases the players'total e¤ort.
Conclusion
We showed (Proposition 1) that in an elimination tournament with a dominant player, namely, one strong player and three weak players, independent of the relation between the players' values (strong/weak), the third place game increases the players'expected total e¤ort in the tournament, but with three strong players and one inferior player who has a lower value of winning (Proposition 2), if the inferior player 's value is su¢ ciently small, then the third place game decreases the players'expected total e¤ort in the tournament.
When the players are balanced, namely, there are two strong and two weak players, we found that the players' seeding in the semi…nal plays a key role on the e¤ect of the third place game on the players'expected total e¤ort. In addition, in an elimination tournament with two strong players who compete against each other in one of the semi…nals and two weak players who compete against each other in the other one, we showed (Proposition 3) that if the weak players' value of winning is su¢ ciently small, then the third place game decreases the players'expected total e¤ort. However, if in each semi…nal players with di¤erent types compete against each other, and in addition, if the weak player's value of winning is su¢ ciently small, we found (see Proposition 4) that the third place game increases the players'expected total e¤ort.
The implication of these results is that in elimination tournaments with two types of players (strong and weak) if there are at least two weak players, by choosing the correct players' seeding in the semi…nal, the third place game has a positive e¤ect on the players'expected total e¤ort; however, if there are at least two strong players, the third place game might have a negative e¤ect on the players' expected total e¤ort. In other words, if there is a dominant player such that the identity of the winner is quite clear, the players exert relatively low e¤orts in the semi…nals such that the third place game increases the players'e¤orts in the second stage (…nal), but also signi…cantly decreases the e¤ort in the …rst stage (semi…nals). In that case, we may …nd that the third place game is not e¢ cient for a designer who wishes to maximize the expected total e¤ort in elimination tournaments.
